AI Security
Writing on AI security: agent credentials and non-human identity, deepfake voice fraud, shadow AI, control-plane gaps, and vendor claims worth auditing.
Where AI meets the security program: agent credentials that already outnumber your people, deepfake voice fraud against authentication, the shadow-AI line between personal tools and unreviewed production systems, and what "we don't train on your data" actually buys you. The lens is a fintech security team defending real workloads, not lab demos.
20 posts, newest first
'We Don't Train on Your Data' Is Not Enough
An agent told to open no files obeyed — while the product uploaded the whole repo, canary included. "We don't train on your data" answers the wrong question.
A Convincing Voice Is Not Authenticated
A cloned voice with matching caller-ID is recognition, not authentication. Move trust onto channels you control: callback on record, dual authorization.
Your Prompt Is the Approval. That's the Gap.
An MCP connector executes writes with no approval screen — your prompt becomes the one boundary nobody governed. That missing gate is a control-plane gap.
Shadow AI: Your "Personal Tool" Is Production
A coding agent stands up a data-touching tool in an afternoon. The moment it needs a login or gets shared, it's a production system nobody reviewed.
Why We Built AgentOS
One model scored 78% in one agent harness and 42% in another. In regulated fintech the harness is where governance lives, so we built our own: AgentOS.
Nobody Is Governing Your Agents' Credentials
Your agents already outnumber your people, they can authenticate but not prove they're authorized, and that's the gap SOC 2 and HIPAA were never built to close.
Stop Trying to Patch Prompt Injection
Prompt injection isn't a bug a vendor will patch — it's a property of how models read context. Design systems that stay safe even when the model is hijacked.
The Control Plane Is the Job
Standing up an agent takes an afternoon; the control plane that lets it touch production safely is the actual engineering work, and almost nobody shows it.
Shadow AI Is the New Shadow IT
Every abandoned notebook and weekend prototype is a credential-bearing asset nobody owns. The fix isn't a ban — it's discovery, demotion, and real sunsets.
Three Token Counts, Zero You Can Attest To
Codex says one number, Claude another, your gateway a third. That isn't a metering problem — it's an attestation problem regulated industries can't afford.
What AI Actually Changes for Attackers
Cutting through the threat inflation: what AI genuinely changes for attackers, what it doesn't, and where a defender's hardening effort actually pays off.
Make Your Enterprise Agent-Readable First
Everyone is racing to buy agents; almost no one builds the substrate that lets them act safely. The productivity is real — so is the blast radius.
AI Found 271 Bugs in Firefox. Now Your Repos?
AI-assisted fuzzing found hundreds of bugs in hardened open-source code. The question is whether you run it before someone else runs it against you.
Source-Map Leaks: Your Pipeline's Confession
One packaging mistake can publish hundreds of thousands of lines of internals. The leak is a confession: release controls never caught up to release velocity.
Shadow-Agent Discovery for Regulated FIs
Unsanctioned AI agents already run in your environment with your credentials. Find, classify, and gate them before they touch member data or an exam does.
Automate the Boring, Not the Judgment
A framework for deciding which security work to hand to machines — and the judgment line you should never let automation cross, no matter the headcount math.
Agent Safety: Engineer the Blast Radius
Most agent "safety" is a politely worded request to a model that need not honor it. The only controls that count still hold after the model goes wrong.
Your Browser Agent Has Your Cookies
Browser AI agents don't request access to your systems — they inherit it from the authenticated sessions in your tabs. A threat model nobody provisioned for.
Anchoring Bias Is Already in Your KYC Agent
The failure modes that made medical LLMs unsafe sit inside your fraud, dispute, and onboarding agents. They don't announce themselves — you have to hunt.
Agent Onboarding Was Easy. Offboarding Isn't.
Every team shipped an agent in a weekend. Almost none can say how it gets fired, what credentials it still holds, or who would notice if it went rogue.